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Is the Garment Industry Trying to Pull
the Wool over Your Eyes?
The Need for Open Communication to
Promote Labor Rights in China
John H. Goolsby*
I. Introduction
The People's Republic of China has a sordid history of labor
rights abuses,' but how best to address labor and other human
* J.D. expected 2002, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1990, Grinnell
College. I would like to thank the editors and staff of Law & Inequality: A Journal
of Theory and Practice, especially Ben Felcher, Francis Green, and Kathleen
Stendahl; Professor David Weissbrodt; and my wife, Stacey, for her comments and
patience.
1. See 1 STATE DEP'T, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1999, 1018, 1019 (2000) ("The [g]overnment continued to restrict tightly worker
rights."), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/
1999_hrp-reportfchina.html. A note on citations to the World Wide Web in this
Article: one purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the value of the Internet as a
tool for the exchange of information. See infra notes 225-250 and accompanying
text. In political environments where the government tightly restricts the
availability of hardcopy sources, as in China, the Internet is particularly valuable.
See infra note 249 and accompanying text. Therefore, in addition to traditional
sources, this Article gives parallel citations to the World Wide Web whenever
possible. Because the "transient" nature of some websites makes Internet
information hard to verify, and makes it difficult to hold purveyors of inaccurate
information accountable, Internet information can be unreliable. See THE
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 18.2.1, at 132 (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000) [hereinafter BLUEBOOK]. This Article
therefore attempts to avoid citations exclusively to Internet sources. In some cases,
however, precious information is not available anywhere else. See id. at 133; see
also infra note 4 (citing English translations of relatively recently enacted Chinese
statutes). For a discussion of factors to consider when assessing the credibility of
conflicting, unverifiable reports of labor conditions in China, see infra notes 175-
181 and accompanying text. This Article follows the latest BLUEBOOK guidelines
for Internet citations, i.e., "available at" preceding a Uniform Resource Locator
(URL) indicates that the source is available both in traditional form and on the
Internet, whereas "at" preceding a URL indicates that the source is found
exclusively on the Internet. See BLUEBOOK, supra, at 133. This Article follows the
practice of giving a parallel Internet citation only the first time a source is cited.
The purpose of citing to the Internet in this Article is to demonstrate how anyone in
the world with Internet access can readily find laws and treaties, information on
legal principles, and reports on labor conditions in China. Therefore, citations to
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rights issues in China has been a vexing problem for U.S. policy
makers.2 The extent to which labor rights problems in China
should concern non-Chinese people has also been a subject of
controversy. 3
While many Chinese laws, particularly those provisions
enacted over the past decade, facially protect many labor rights, 4
abuses of such rights continue in spite of the law.5  U.S.
corporations, particularly garment manufacturers, are turning
increasingly to factories in China and other developing nations as
a cheap means of manufacturing products for sale in the United
States.6 Labor rights activists in the United States have long
argued for conditioning China's acceptance into the world
economic community upon an improvement in its labor and human
rights record.7  These labor activists focused much of their
energies on attempting to defeat the Normal Trade Relations for
the People's Republic of China Act, commonly referred to as the
Permanent Normal Trade Relations Act, or PNTR.8 While the
commercial Internet sources that require a fee for access, such as Lexis.com or
Westlaw.com, are avoided.
2. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 111, S8727-29 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Harkin) (explaining his belief that "there is no standard cut-and-
dried approach when it comes to advancing human rights," and that his decision to
vote for normal trade relations for the People's Republic of China had been a
difficult one, considering the complex factors weighing on both sides). All parts of
the Congressional Record cited in this Article are available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/.
3. See Erik Eckholm, China's Rights Stand& Progress or an Irrelevance?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at A9.
4. See, e.g., China Labour Act § 7 (1994), translated at
http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/E94CHNO1.htm ("Labourers shall have the right to
participate in and organize trade unions .... "); § 15 ("No employing units shall be
allowed to recruit juveniles under the age of 16."); § 33 (permitting workers to enter
into a collective contract with employers); § 36 (providing that workers "shall work
for no more than eight hours a day [and/or] more than forty-four hours a week on
average"); § 48 ('CThe state shall implement a system of guaranteed minimum
wages.").
5. See STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1059-64; see also CHARLES KERNAGHAN,
MADE IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF U.S. COMPANIES IN DENYING HUMAN AND WORKER
RIGHTS 1 (2000), available at http://www.nlcnet.org/reportOO/introduction.html
(citing examples of labor rights abuses by U.S. corporations in China).
6. See Labour Rights in China, No Illusions: Against the Global Cosmetics
SA8000, CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN (1999), at http://www.china-
labour.org.hk/9907e/esa8OOO.htm [hereinafter No Illusions].
7. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, Senate Ignores China's Human Rights Abuses and Votes
for Permanent Trade Rights, at http://www.aflcio.org/news/2000/0919_china.htm
(last visited Apr. 4, 2001) (describing the AFL-CIO's fight against the Normal
Trade Relations for the People's Republic of China Act as part of an ongoing effort
to protect workers' rights internationally).
8. See The Normal Trade Relations for the People's Republic of China Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114 Stat. 880, (2000) [hereinafter PNTR].
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U.S. Congress expressed grave concerns over human rights abuses
in China during debates on PNTR,9 it apparently rejected the
argument that the United States could effectively use the threat of
withholding Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status as leverage
to advance U.S. interests. 10 On October 10, 2000, President
Clinton signed PNTR into law, putting an end to the United
States's annual review of China's MFN trade status.1 1 The
passage of PNTR guarantees China's admittance into the World
Trade Organization (WTO),' 2 which has virtually no provisions
concerning labor rights.' 3
Because of the close relation of labor rights to the global
economy, and because of the unique impact foreign labor issues
have on U.S. interests, the focus of this Article is Chinese
industrial labor rights abuses, as opposed to other human rights
abuses.' 4 While labor rights abuses are by no means unique to
9. See id. § 511(b) (authorizing the Secretary of Labor "to establish a program
to conduct rule of law training and technical assistance related to the protection of
internationally recognized worker rights in the People's Republic of China"); § 513
(prohibiting funds for such a program from being provided to any Chinese entity
that the President has reason to believe is committing human rights violations).
10. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S8729 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Harkin) ('In the case of China, I am convinced that granting PNTR will not hinder
our efforts to improve human rights there. I believe, in fact, it will actually help us
in that endeavor.").
11. See PNTR § 101(a)(1) (terminating the application to China of the law
calling for annual trade status review); see also Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§
2431-2439 (1994) (establishing annual trade status review that preceded PNTR).
12. See PNTR § 101(b).
13. The agreement establishing the WTO incorporates by reference the
document commonly known as GATT 1947. See Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization [World Trade Organization], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
GATT 1947 provides that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures.., relating to the products of prison labour.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61-V Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT]. In other words, WTO nations are not required to regulate
against trade in the products of prison labor, but such regulations are an exception
to the general rule against barriers to free trade. There are no similar provisions
for other labor rights abuses. See also AFL-CIO, The WTO: Uniquely Positioned to
Enforce Workers' Rights, at
http://www.aflcio.org/globaleconomy/workers_05_enforce.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2001) (explaining that provisions for protection of workers' rights are absent from
the WTO, and calling for the inclusion of such provisions).
14. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
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China, events currently unfolding bring China's labor situation to
the fore.
A discussion of the labor situation in Chinese factories
implicates several principles of public policy. First is the
international legal principle of national sovereignty. 15 Second is
the principle of a free-market economy.16 Third is the
philosophical principle that human rights abuses anywhere should
be a matter of global concern.' 7 The issue of conditions in Chinese
factories also has broad practical implications for Americans.' 8
Section II of this Article discusses the interplay of these
abstract and practical considerations. A detailed account of the
problem leads into an explanation of justifications for outsiders'
concern with the Chinese labor rights situation. 19 A description of
five possible approaches to the issue follows: relying on China's
own municipal laws;20 advancing labor rights through PNTR;21
applying business codes of conduct;22  implementing
intergovernmental organizations' mechanisms for promoting
compliance with treaties; 23 and promoting greater awareness
among Chinese workers of their own legal rights through
communications media such as the Internet. 24
Section III assesses the effectiveness of the various strategies
by first looking at their limitations, and then discussing how those
limitations might be overcome. 25 This Article argues that the
unifying theme behind all the strategies for improving workers'
rights in China must be a drive for more open communication. To
advance workers' rights in China, Chinese laborers must have
15. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
16. See also David Weissbrodt & Marci Hoffman, The Global Economy and
Human Rights: A Selective Bibliography, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 189, 189 (1997)
("Developments in this century suggest... that market economy and free trade
foster economic development and thus promote many economic rights as well as
civil and political rights."). See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 22-25 (Lloyd Reynolds & William
Fellner eds., Irwin Paperback Classics in Econ. 1968) (1776) (articulating principles
that became the foundation of classic Western economics).
17. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., Preamble, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
18. See infra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 29-87 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 101.129 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 130-146 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 147-157 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 158-250 and accompanying text.
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greater access to information about their rights under
international standards and the laws of their own country, 26 they
must be able to voice grievances effectively, 27 and outsiders must
be able to find out what really happens in Chinese factories. 28
This Article concludes that a reduction in constraints on
communication is necessary to advance each of these goals, and
that the Internet holds unique promise for doing so. Thus for
China to be open for business without trammeling workers' rights,
it must also become open to the free flow of ideas.
II. Background
A. The Problem
Whether as a result of facial inadequacy of Chinese laws or
their inadequate enforcement, various accounts of widespread
labor rights abuses continue to emerge from China. 29 Reports of
some of the worst atrocities come from factories making garments
and shoes for export to the United States. The National Labor
Committee has recently reported, for example, that Timberland
shoes are made in China by "16 and 17-year-old girls [forced to]
work.., up to 14 hours a day, seven days a week putting in a 98-
hour workweek... earning 22 cents an hour... [often in] [f]actory
temperature[s] reach[ing] more than 100 degrees F[ahrenheit]."30
The obstruction of the free exchange of information and ideas
is at the root of many of the labor problems in China. This
obstruction operates on three levels. First, the Chinese system
denies factory employees the right to speak freely to the outside
world about what goes on in their workplaces. For example, the
26. See 146 CONG. REC. 111, S8728 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Harkin) (citing as an example of China's "unacceptable" human rights situation the
case of "a lawyer who was arrested and thrown in jail. His offense: he had set up a
small table outside a factory to advise workers of their rights under Chinese law.").
27. See Proposed Draft Principles Relating to Human Rights Conduct by
Companies, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/WG.2/WP.1, $ 29 (2000) [hereinafter Draft Principles].
28. See CHARLES KERNAGHAN, MADE IN CHINA: BEHIND THE LABEL 7 (1998),
("Without corporate disclosure, guaranteeing the public's right to know, there is no
way to hold corporations accountable for human and worker rights - and these
abuses will continue behind closed doors.").
29. See STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1019.
30. KERNAGHAN, supra note 28, at 7. For further examples of labor rights
abuses, see id. at 71-76; see also STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1059-64. For an
assessment of the reliability of reports from non-governmental organizations




same young women working under such oppressive conditions in
the Timberland factory "are threatened and coached to lie to U.S.
Company auditors."3' Second, the system denies legal advocates
the right to send, and workers the right to receive, information
about workers' rights. An example is the report from China of "a
lawyer who was arrested and thrown in jail. His offense: he had
set up a small table outside a factory to advise workers of their
rights under Chinese law." 32 Finally, the system denies workers
the right to communicate with one another for the purpose of
forming associations to air their grievances collectively before
management. 33
B. Justifications for Outsiders to Concern Themselves with
the Problem in China
Before reaching the question of how labor rights in China can
be advanced, it is necessary to first answer the question of why
outsiders should concern themselves. Article two, paragraph
seven of the U.N. Charter reflects the traditional belief that each
nation is entitled to govern itself, and therefore has a right to
freedom from outside intervention. It states that "[n]othing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."34
However, this principle of national sovereignty has competed
with the principle of the universality of human rights, embodied in
other provisions of the U.N. Charter. 35 The latter principle has
gained prominence as the international community has become
increasingly interconnected since World War II. One commentator
explains that "in practice U.N. concern with violations of human
rights has moved from the highly restricted category of violations
threatening international peace and security, to the wider
category of gross violations constituting a consistent pattern, to
the present broad category of violations of any U.N. human rights
standard."36 Thus, the application of the principle of national
31. KERNAGHAN, supra note 28, at 7.
32. 146 CONG. REC. 111, S8728 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Harkin).
33. See STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1059.
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
35. See id. arts. 56 & 57.
36. MENNO T. KAMMINGA, INTER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 119 (1992).
(Vol. 19:193
LABOR RIGHTS IN CHINA
sovereignty to human rights issues may soon become no more than
a chapter in history.
Then again, China may be a special case that still requires
some deference to the principle of national sovereignty. While
China's opposition to human rights initiatives often seems like a
transparent and tyrannical control device,3 7 a consistent stand
merits some respect. Indeed, one commentator has noted that "[o]f
all member states, the People's Republic of China has had one of
the most consistently 'anti-interventionist' voting records on
human rights questions, even before China itself became the
subject of a U.N. resolution."3 8
Moreover, history entitles China and other developing
nations to be resentful and suspicious of European and American
colonialism and imperialism.39 It is perhaps a form of values-
imperialism to impose Western standards of fairness on China in
disregard of the universally recognized right of self-determination
for nation-states. 40 Western do-gooders perhaps have no business
championing human rights on behalf of foreign workers who do
not necessarily share the Western view of the value of human
rights. 41 This consideration is especially relevant if human rights
are won at the expense of economic opportunity for people trying
to improve their meager lot in life. 4
2
Therefore, outsiders whose instinct is to push for reform
inside China should be careful to provide justifications, for actions
that may constitute infringements upon China's national
37. See, e.g., Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement
Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade
Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 1, 1-2 (1996) (describing China's
response during the 1994 debate in the United States concerning whether to renew
China's MFN status).
38. KAMMINGA, supra note 36, at 109.
39. See PETER MALANCZUK, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 13
(7th ed. 1999). Malanczuk elaborates:
[I]n the nineteenth century the international community to a large extent
had virtually become a European one on the basis of either conquest or
domination. By about 1880, Europeans had subdued most of the non-
European states, which was interpreted in Europe as conclusive proof of
the inherent superiority of the white man, and the international legal
system became a white mans' club, to which non-European states would be
admitted only if they produced evidence that they were "civilized."
Id.
40. See id. at 211.
41. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of
Workers'Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 131 (1999).
42. See MALANCZUK, supra note 39, at 211 ('In many parts of the world social
and economic rights have the same or even greater importance for the individual
than the rights of liberty.").
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sovereignty. In the final analysis, however, there are sufficient
justifications for foreigners to concern themselves with the labor
situation in China.
As mentioned, the first justification is the notion that
humans everywhere should be concerned with human rights
abuses anywhere. 43  This concept is most comprehensively
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which by
its very title suggests that human rights concerns transcend
national borders.44 The Preamble provides:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience
of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings
shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear
and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people...
Now, therefore, The General Assembly Proclaims this
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.45
Many human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
take up this theme, suggesting that compassion dictates a concern
for one's fellow humans in foreign lands.46 This human rights
rationale is the most value-laden justification for involvement in
China, and thus is the most subject to criticisms of cultural
imperialism.47
The justifications for promoting labor rights in China do not
end with an abstract concern for human rights. A second
justification is likewise based fundamentally on conscience, but
looks at the situation from a practical angle. This is the consumer-
interest justification: no consumer should have to be complicit in a
system at odds with his or her own values, whatever they may
be. 48 For example, if a student at a U.S. university believes that it
43. See Howse, supra note 41, at 149.
44. See Universal Declaration, supra note 17.
45. Id. at Preamble.
46. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT 2000, at 273 (2000) (explaining that
Amnesty International takes global action on the belief that "all human rights
should be enjoyed by all people at all times," without regard to borders), available
at http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf/ar20OO.
47. See Howse, supra note 41, at 150-51.
48. See generally COUNCIL ON ECON. PRIORITIES, SHOPPING FOR A BETTER
WORLD: THE QUICK AND EASY GUIDE TO ALL YOUR SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
SHOPPING (2000) (providing report cards on transnational corporations (TNCs)
ostensibly to enable consumers to make informed and conscientious purchasing
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is immoral for thirteen-year-old children to be put to work in
garment factories, that student is entitled to assurances that the
jersey he buys at his campus bookstore has in fact not been made
by a thirteen-year-old.49 Inasmuch as goods made in China are
sold to U.S. consumers, those consumers are entitled to concern
themselves with what happens in the factories where the goods
are made. 50  Thus, the assertion that how China solves its
problems is strictly China's business, fails. In an increasingly
global economy, China's labor problems are outsiders' business.5 1
This justification does not fall so easily to criticisms of Western
value bias because, at least theoretically, it works in reverse: a
Chinese consumer is likewise entitled to assurances that she is
avoiding U.S.-made products whose modes of production do not
comport with her values.
This consumer-interest justification, while compelling, is
limited in its application. Under this rationale, American scrutiny
of Chinese factories is justified only for those factories producing
goods for export to the United States. 52 This Article focuses on
factory labor, as opposed to agricultural or mining labor, not only
because some of the worst Chinese labor abuses take place in
factories, 53 but also because China's chief exports to the United
States are factory-made goods.5 4
Conversely, perhaps the conscientious American consumer
can best help the average Chinese worker by supporting a legal
and economic system that will increase the Chinese standard of
living instead of insisting on specific provisions of labor law. 55 Do
decisions).
49. See generally UNITED STUDENTS AGAINST SWEATSHOPS, at
http://home.sprintmail.com/-jeffnkariUSAS/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2001).
50. See KERNAGHAN, supra note 28, at 66-67.
51. See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It - And Why the United States Shouldn't:
The United States' International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for Their
Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAULBUS. L.J. 395, 397 (1999).
52. See KERNAGHAN, supra note 28, at 67.
53. See, e.g., KERNAGHAN, supra note 5, at 1 ('Recent in-depth investigations of
16 factories in China producing car stereos, bikes, shoes, sneakers, clothing, TVs,
hats and bags for some of the largest U.S. companies clearly demonstrate that Wal-
Mart, Nike, Huffy and others and their contractors in China continue to
systematically violate the most fundamental human and worker rights, while
paying below subsistence wages.").
54. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. TRADE BY COMMODITY WITH CHINA, at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/top8Octy/china.cp (last updated May
25, 2000) (showing "Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles" as the top category in
1999 of U.S. imports from China at forty-two billion dollars).
55. See STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1018 (explaining that Chinese reforms
tending towards a market-based economy have helped raise the standard of living
there); see also China Labour Act § 10 (1994), translated at
2001]
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we really help the Chinese worker if we insist on labor standards
so rigid that Nike, for example, no longer finds it profitable to have
its factory there, and the worker ends up unemployed? 56
The third justification for U.S. concern with Chinese factories
is the adverse impact on U.S. labor of labor rights abuses in
developing countries. 57 The unequal position of Chinese laborers
relative to their U.S. counterparts threatens to undermine the
gains that organized labor has made in this country, because U.S.
corporations will, in a "race to the bottom," take their jobs where
the labor is cheapest. 58 In one sense, American and Chinese
workers compete with each other for jobs, 59 but in another sense,
they have a common interest in implementing global labor
standards, precisely so they will not have to compete with each
other.60 After all, if labor standards are elevated not just in China,
but everywhere else in the world, Nike will have no place else to
take its business. 61
In this context, it is worth noting that American labor's
involvement in the issue is not motivated purely by altruistic
concerns for its Chinese counterparts, nor even for American
consumers. 62  It is not clear whether altruistic concerns or
practical ramifications are the more justifiable grounds for inquiry
into the internal affairs of foreign nations. Although altruistic
http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/E94CHN01.htm C'The state shall create conditions for
employment and increase opportunities for employment by means of the promotion
of economic and social development.").
56. See Worker Rights Consortium, Worker Rights Consortium for the
Enforcement of University Licensing Codes of Conduct, at
http://www.workersrights.org/detailed_outline.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2001)
('Once violations at a site have been confirmed, the pressure on the licensee will be
to improve conditions, rather than to shut down factories where violations have
been found. Otherwise, there would be an incentive for workers not to report
abusive conditions.").
57. See No Illusions, supra note 6.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See AFL-CIO, supra note 7 ('The fight against permanent NTR for China
was part of the AFL-CIO's ongoing campaign to 'Make the Global Economy Work
for Working Families' by joining together with unions, human rights groups and
other allies around the world to end child labor and sweatshops, protect and
expand the rights of workers and provide a counterbalance to powerful and rich
multinational corporations.").
61. See Constitution of the International Labour Organization, June 28, 1919,
Preamble, 49 Stat. 2712, 2714, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, 36 [hereinafter ILO Constitution]
('The failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in
the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own
countries ... ").
62. See Howse, supra note 41, at 150 (listing several grounds in addition to
altruism for extending labor concerns beyond national borders).
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motivations seem more laudable by definition, motivations based
purely on self-interest are perhaps more defensible because they
do not depend on subjective value judgments. In the end, U.S.
policy arguments regarding trade with China have largely
revolved around what is in the best interests of the United States,
not what is the right thing to do in the abstract.63 Hence, U.S.
labor's stance, even if self-serving to a degree, is perfectly
consistent with the ground rules for debate on trade policy.
The consumer-interest and labor-interest justifications have
certain parallels. 64 Both seek to end inhumane and unfair working
conditions overseas. 65 Both apply only to labor abuses as opposed
to other human rights abuses, and both apply primarily to
factories making goods for U.S. markets, because workers there
are in the most direct competition with U.S. laborers. 66
However, once certain minimum standards for wages and
working conditions are met, American consumer and labor
interests diverge. 67 The U.S. consumer, once she can be assured
that she is not buying into a system contrary to her own values,
has an interest in purchasing the best quality merchandise at the
best price, and does not want superfluous labor costs passed on to
her.68 The U.S. laborer, on the other hand, whose job may pay
something more than minimum wage, has an interest in ensuring
that Chinese wages are no lower than his are. 69 Thus, any
63. See infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing pros and cons of
PNTR).
64. See COUNCIL ON ECON. PRIORITIES, supra note 48, at 1-2 (explaining that
consumers are entitled to be alerted about companies that fail to establish
adequate workplace standards).
65. See id. at 3.
66. See 145 CONG. REC. 111, S8682 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Byrd) C'I believe that PNTR and the new U.S.-China trade pact, that panacea of all
good things, will encourage mainly one phenomenon - one phenomenon; namely,
more U.S. corporations will move operations to China to capitalize on low-wage
production for export back here to the United States.").
67. See COUNCIL ON ECON. PRIORITIES, supra note 48, at 1-2 (detailing
American consumers' support for international basic workers' rights). But see Brad
L. Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the World Trade Organization'
Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN J. GLOBAL TRADE
369, 387 (2000) (noting benefits of free trade to consumers in the form of increased
choices of goods).
68. See No Illusions, supra note 6 (explaining that TNCs operate to "meet
consumer demands of quality, price and timing."). See generally PNTR, Pub. L. No.
106-286, § 103, 114 Stat. 880, 882 (2000) (providing safeguards against market
disruption, and reflecting the assumption consumers will want to buy equivalent
products at the cheapest price).
69. See 146 CONG. REC. 111, S8683 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Byrd) ('Good paying jobs with good benefits, largely in the manufacturing sector,
are leaving our shores and being replaced by low skill, low wage jobs in the services
2001]
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proposal that seeks to rely on both U.S. consumer and labor
interests as justifications for promoting Chinese labor rights
should go no further than ensuring a minimum code of conduct for
businesses.
As a corollary to the consumer interest justification, some
commentators cite corporate interests as another rationale for
promoting labor rights in China, arguing that businesses have an
interest in maintaining fair conditions in factories because
consumers demand it.70 More precisely stated, however, the
business interest is in maintaining the appearance of fair
conditions in factories, while keeping labor costs as low as
possible. 71 This is a motivation towards a very different end than
the improvement of workers' positions. When labor rights abuses
do occur, consumers want to facilitate open communication, while
businesses want to suppress it.72 Business interests therefore
cannot properly be understood as an alternative motivation for
promoting labor rights in China.
China's treaty obligations form the fourth and final
justification for scrutinizing labor conditions inside China. As a
U.N. member, China has a general obligation under the U.N.
Charter to promote human rights in the economic and social
context. 73  Moreover, China has ratified some international
conventions that articulate specific fair labor practices.74 Insisting
sector.").
70. See, e.g., Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 157 (1997) (describing the corporate interest
argument).
71. See No Illusions, supra note 6.
72. See id.
73. See U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Article 55 provides:
The United Nations shall promote:
(A) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development;
(B)solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; ... and
(C) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion.
Id. The next article states that "all Members pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. art. 56; see also id. art. 2, para. 2 ("All
Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in
accordance with the present Charter.").
74. See Convention Concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in Industrial
Undertakings, Nov. 17, 1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 17 (ratified by China May 17, 1934);
Convention Concerning the Creation of Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery, June
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on compliance with such principles, thus, is not meddling in
internal Chinese affairs, but rather holding China to its admitted
international obligations. 75 This justification does not suffer from
the abstraction and potential value bias of the human rights
justification. 76  Furthermore, China's treaty obligations apply
equally to all Chinese factories, unlike the consumer and labor
interest justifications. 77  Still, holding China accountable for
enforcement of labor rights and other human rights on the
16, 1928, 39 U.N.T.S. 3 (ratified by China May 5, 1930); Convention Concerning
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297
(ratified by China Apr. 28, 1999) (setting fifteen years as the minimum age for
work, with certain exceptions). Although some of these conventions were signed or
ratified by the Nationalist Chinese government prior to the Communist revolution,
the current Chinese government has apparently not questioned the validity of such
treaties on those grounds. All of the conventions listed are in force under
international law. See Int'l Labour Org., Ratifications of the Fundamental Human
Rights Conventions by Country (Nov. 12, 2000), at
http://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/publicenglishldocs/declprint.htm.
China has not, however, ratified the following labor rights treaties:
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, Sept.
7, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention,
July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257; Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory
Labour, June 26, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 291; Convention Concerning the Abolition of
Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291; Convention Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362
U.N.T.S. 31; Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1207 (not
yet in force). See Int'l Labour Org., supra. Nor has China ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M.
368, a more general human rights treaty [hereinafter CCPR]. See Int'l Labour
Org., supra.
The United States, by comparison, has ratified the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, but has ratified neither the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, nor several of the other treaties mentioned above. See Int'l Labour
Org., supra. Thus, neither country has ratified anything approaching the full slate
of labor rights treaties. However, the United States has, through alternative
domestic measures, more fully embraced the principles embodied even in those
conventions it has not ratified. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1947) (preserving the
right to strike).
Because ratification of ILO treaties does not correlate to passage of parallel
domestic laws, treaties are not a good measure of a nation-state's endorsement of
international labor rights standards. Instead, ratification by a country is
significant because it provides both a rationale and a means for other countries to
pressure for labor rights across borders.
75. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 ('Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith.").
76. See Howse, supra note 41, at 169-71.
77. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in
Industrial Undertakings, supra note 74, art. 2 (providing that "the hours of persons
employed in any public or private industrial undertaking or any branch thereof'
shall be limited by the treaty).
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grounds of that nation's treaty obligations is limited only to the
terms of the treaties it has ratified. 78
China's international agreements provide a much stronger
justification for intervention today than they did even a few short
months ago. China's ratification on February 28, 2001, of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights79
signals its willingness to comply with the agreement's provisions
protecting: "just and favourable conditions of work;"80 "the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living;"81 "the right of
everyone to form trade unions" and the "right to strike."82
Furthermore, although China has left the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights unratified, it has recently
made a commitment on paper to work with the United Nations on
the broader human rights issues covered by that treaty.8 3 On
November 20, 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson completed a
Memorandum of Understanding sketching a plan for China to get
outside help conforming with provisions of both the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Covenant on Civil
78. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 75, art. 26.
79. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Ratifies Major U.N. Rights Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at A9.
80. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 7, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 [hereinafter CESCR]. "Just and favourable
conditions of work" include "fair wages," "a decent living," "safe and healthy
working conditions," "equal opportunity... to be promoted," and "rest, leisure and
reasonable limitation of working hours ...." Id.
81. Id. art. 11.
82. Id. art. 8. More fully, section 1 of article 8 provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of
his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the
promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others;
(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or
confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international
trade-union organizations;
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations
other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the
laws of the particular country.
Id.
83. CCPR, supra note 74, art. 22.
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and Political Rights.8 4  These treaties include provisions
concerning the right to strike85 and freedom of expression. 86 By
ratifying the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
and by signing the Memorandum of Understanding regarding that
treaty and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, China has
apparently acceded to greater outside involvement in the human
rights situation there. 87
The overall rationale for Americans to take an interest in
Chinese labor rights abuses is strongest when the individual
justifications overlap. This Article therefore primarily addresses
means for improving labor conditions in those Chinese factories
that produce goods for export to the United States; provide jobs
that might otherwise go to U.S. workers; and fail to comply with
minimum labor standards China has recognized by treaty.
C. Potential Solutions
1. China's Internal Laws
China has municipal statutes and regulations largely
consistent with international standards on child labor, minimum
wage, maximum work hours, and the rights to unionize and
collectively bargain.88 Chinese officials claim that there is no
cause for concern because such laws adequately protect labor
rights.8 9 However, human rights reports on China tell a story of
lax enforcement of these laws. 90 Although some observers point to
passage of the Labor Act of 1994 as evidence of a trend toward
greater recognition of labor rights,9 1 others maintain that despite
passage of these laws, conditions are not improving. 92
84. See Eckholm, supra note 3.
85. See CESCR, supra note 80, art. 8(1)(d).
86. See CCPR, supra note 74, art. 19.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., supra note 4.
89. See, e.g., Committee Report on Complaint Against the Government of China
Presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, (ICFTU), ILO
Report No. 316, § 351 [hereinafter ILO Report No. 316] (summarizing the Chinese
government's position that the Labor Law provides adequate provisions for
settlement of collective bargaining disputes).
90. See, e.g., STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1019 ("The government continued to
restrict tightly worker rights."); KERNAGHAN, supra note 5, at 1.
91. See Hilary K Josephs, Labor Law in a "Socialist Market
Economy" The Case of China, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 559, 559-60 (1995).
92. See Anita Chan, Workers' Rights Are Human Rights, CHINA RTs. F.
(Summer 1997), at http://www.hrichina.
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2. Possibilities for Reform Facilitated by PNTR
Historically, the United States used the threat of not
renewing China's MFN trade status as a means to draw attention
to, if not actively advance, human rights in China. 93 Some
proponents of PNTR for China argued that the loss of this leverage
was really no loss at all, because it was never used effectively. 94
While the extended implications of passing PNTR are the
subject of great controversy, 95 PNTR by its terms essentially
accomplishes two things. First, it puts an end to United States's
annual review of China's trade status.96  Second, it removes
barriers to trade with China by paving the way for China to join
the WTO. 97
The WTO currently has essentially no provisions for labor
standards. 98  Nevertheless, proponents of PNTR tout possible
93. See, e.g., Stirling, supra note 37, at 1-2 (illustrating how trade regulation is
potentially the most effective mechanism for the enforcement of human rights).
94. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S8729 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Harkin).
95. Compare, e.g., U.S. -Bilateral Trade Agreement and the Accession of China to
the World Trade Organization: Hearing on H.R. 4444 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 46 (2000) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4444]
(statement of the Honorable Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative)
(arguing that China's accession to the WTO will provide the United States with
"new export opportunities that mean jobs and growth for Americans"), with ROBERT
E. SCOTT, CHINA CAN WAIT: WTO ACCESSION DEAL MUST INCLUDE ENFORCEABLE
LABOR RIGHTS, REAL COMMERCIAL BENEFITS 7 (1999) (predicting that China's
accession to the WTO could result in "a net loss of 607,000 jobs in the U.S., mostly
in the manufacturing sector."). Supporters of PNTR also claimed that to defeat the
bill would have put U.S. workers at a competitive disadvantage with the rest of
world in accessing China's markets. See President's Message to Congress on PNTR
Status for China, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 493 (Mar. 8, 2000). This argument
seems to rely on the dubious proposition that U.S. corporations will pass along to
American workers any benefit gained from doing business with China. See SCOTT,
supra, at 2 (Trhe WTO deal outlined by the U:S. trade representative in April
[1999] would primarily benefit U.S. companies that invest in China while harming
workers in both countries."). In fact, it is unclear whether many corporations will
ultimately have any U.S. workers at all. Corporations such as Nike, for example,
already "only retain design, accounting, public relations and retailing in their home
base in the developed countries." See No Illusions, supra note 6. Fortunately for
U.S. workers, PNTR comes at a time when U.S. unemployment is at historic lows.
See 145 CONG. REC. 111, S8683 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
96. See PNTR, Pub. L. No. 106-286, § 103, 114 Stat. 880, 882 (2000).
97. See id. § 101(b).
98. See Stirling, supra note 37, at 33. Since the U.S. Senate vote for PNTR
(including granting China acceptance into the WTO in its current form) was 83-15,
there seems to be no political will to change the WTO to include labor provisions.
See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes, 106th Congress, 2d Sess. (2000), at
http://www.senate.gov/legislature/vote. 1062/vote_0025 .html; see also Howse, supra
note 41, at 132 ('Resistance within the World Trade Organization to any formal
linkage between trade and core international labor rights remains powerful.").
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positive consequences for labor and other human rights,99 arguing
that the influx of people and ideas will help to bring positive
change in China. 10 0  This argument recognizes that open
communication is central to reform in China.
3. Business Codes of Conduct
In recent years, voluntary business codes of conduct have
emerged as another possible avenue for promoting compliance
with international labor standards in factories worldwide.' 0 U.S.
labor rights proponents may have viewed business codes of
conduct as a weak alternative to holding China's MFN status
contingent upon an improved labor rights record; 02 however, the
passage of PNTR may require labor rights proponents to take
another look at business codes of conduct and other alternatives to
annual review of MFN status.
These business codes of conduct have generally taken one of
two forms: modest rules to which businesses voluntarily subscribe,
or sterner provisions that businesses are somehow pressured into
accepting.'0 3 The story of the response to campus concerns that
U.S. universities were selling sweatshop-made garments is
illustrative of the tension between these two approaches to
business codes of conduct.10 4 At President Clinton's behest, the
White House Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) was created in
1996, bringing together representatives from human rights groups
and universities. 0 5 Garment corporations such as Nike were also
99. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (citing Senator Harkin's
statement that he thought PNTR might actually help human rights endeavors).
100. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 4444, supra note 95, at 38 (statement of
Honorable Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative) (claiming that China's
acceptance into the international community through accession to the WTO "will
give China's people more access to information, and weaken the ability of
hardliners in government to isolate China's public from outside influences and
ideas").
101. See, e.g., Fair Labor Ass'n, Workplace Code of Conduct (1997), at
http://www.fairlabor.org/html/amendctr.html; Soc. Accountability Int'l, Social
Accountability 8000, at http://www.sa-intl.org/sa8000.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2001).
102. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, Senate Ignores China's Human Rights Abuses and Votes
for Permanent Trade Rights, at http://www.aflcio.org/news/2000/0919_china.htm
(last visited Apr. 4, 2001) (describing the AFL-CIO's fight against PNTR as part of
an ongoing effort to protect workers' rights internationally).
103. See Worker Rights Consortium, Worker Rights Consortium Executive
Summary, at http://www.workersrights.org/executive.summary.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2001).
104. See Fair Labor Ass'n, Fair Labor Association Questions & Answers, at
http://www.fairlabor.org/html/affiliates/university.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2001).
105. See Sweatshop Watch, Fair Labor Association=Starvation Wage (Dec. 1998),
20011
Law and Inequality
invited to participate.10 6 Out of the AIP grew the Fair Labor
Association (FLA), which in 1998 developed a code of conduct for
U.S. businesses using overseas factories, and provided a plan for
monitoring compliance. 107
Critics argued that any entity with a structure based on
engagement with corporate interests such as Nike could not be
entrusted to ensure the fair treatment of laborers. s08 Indeed,
many of the labor and human rights groups that had been part of
the AIP refused to be signatories to the FLA, objecting that the
code of conduct and the monitoring plan were biased in favor of the
corporations. These skeptics claimed that the FLA was little more
than a public relations gambit for the big corporations, who had no
intention of jeopardizing their cheap sources of labor.1 09 In the
spring of 2000, American labor groups, students, and human
rights groups not aligned with the FLA established the Worker
Rights Consortium (WRC) as an alternative." 0 Supporters of the
FLA countered that the corporations are key players, and that the
new organization, by not enlisting corporate cooperation, cannot be
effective as a practical matter.'1 ' Sixty-two schools have signed on
with the new WRC," 2 while another 147 schools are allied with
the corporate-affiliated FLA."1
The U.N. has also articulated a set of principles for business
conduct." 4  This "Global Compact," announced by Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in January 1999, asks businesses to subscribe




108. See id. The FLA board is set up to include six seats for companies and six
seats for NGOs. See Fair Labor Ass'n, supra note 104.
109. See Sweatshop Watch, supra note 105.
110. See Maria Roeper, Worker Rights Consortium, An Anti-Sweatshop
Initiative, Holds Founding Conference (Apr. 7, 2000), at
http:l/www.workersrights.org/conferencepress.release.html.
111. See Fair Labor Ass'n, supra note 104 (stating their belief that "lasting
change is more likely if companies make an affirmative commitment to the FLA's
code of conduct and its monitoring principles" and characterizing the WRC's
approach as "more adversarial ... to companies").
112. See WRC Member Sch. (including the University of Minnesota), at
http://www.workersrights.org/member-schools.html (current through Oct. 18,
2000).
113. See Fair Labor Ass'n, Colleges and Universities Affiliated with the FLA
(including Grinnell College), at http://www.fairlabor.org/html/
affiliates/university.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2001).
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of Human Rights, the Declaration of the International Labour
Organization on fundamental principles and rights, and other
U.N. documents. 115 The Global Compact addresses environmental
concerns, labor rights issues, and more general human rights
issues within businesses' "sphere of influence." 116  The nine
principles are broad generalities, and the Global Compact has no
provisions whatsoever concerning monitoring compliance. 17 The
Global Compact falls into the category of modest codes to which
businesses are asked to voluntarily subscribe.
However, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights is in the
process of developing a more detailed set of guidelines for
corporate behavior.118  The new U.N. scheme attempts to
synthesize various prior codes created by the U.N. or other
international organizations, corporations, unions, or NGOs. 19 The
explanatory paper accompanying the proposed code presents the
draft simply as "a point of departure for discussion."'120 The draft
includes detailed provisions for company conduct, but lacks any
recognition of the right to strike, as provided for in the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 121
In its current stage of development, the draft contains only
provisions concerning corporate conduct and general provisions
requiring "independent verification and regular reporting."122
More specific provisions concerning monitoring compliance are to
come in a later draft. The drafters make no attempt at this stage
to say whether the code "should be voluntary, legally binding, or
how it should be enforced or implemented."'' 23 They suggest that
for now, companies might voluntarily adopt the code of conduct, 24
but predict that their set of principles "might eventually be viewed




118. See Draft Principles, supra note 27.
119. See id. 19.
120. Id. 1 21.
121. See CESCR, supra note 80, art. 8(1)(d) C'The States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to ensure... the right to strike, provided that it is exercised
in conformity with the laws of the particular country."). China became a party to
this convention on February 28, 2001. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying
text.
122. Draft Principles, supra note 27, 39.
123. Id. 22.




"companies.. . cannot be asked to replace governments in their
primary responsibilities for the protection of human rights." 126
The drafters acknowledge that "a major challenge in regard
to such human rights codes of conduct is the development of
procedures for monitoring compliance, verifying implementation,
and reporting,"' 27 and suggest that these issues will be given
careful consideration in future drafts. The drafters comment that
"companies should make known to stakeholders the location of
their offices, subsidiaries, and factories, so that stakeholders can
be reassured that the companies' products and services are being
produced under conditions that respect labour and other human
rights standards."'128 The authors further note that such a code
will be most effective when businesses allow "unannounced
inspection visits by monitors, protection of the confidentiality of
complainants, [and] unsupervised interviews of workers during
any visits." 129
4. Enforcement of Treaties by International Bodies
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the "principle
judicial organ of the United Nations."'130 Nations party to the ICJ
generally have recourse to the ICJ to resolve treaty disputes. 131
Created in an era before transnational corporations (TNCs) and
international non-governmental organizations were significant
players in international affairs, 132 the Statute of the International
Court of Justice provides that "[o]nly states may be parties in
cases before the Court."'133 Nations submit to the jurisdiction of
the ICJ voluntarily, 13 4 but once the ICJ's jurisdiction is accepted,
the decisions are considered legally binding. 135
A second avenue is available for promoting treaty compliance
for those treaties that fall under the International Labour
126. Id. 17.
127. Id. 24.
128. Id. 15 n.50. The document explains that "the term 'stakeholder' includes
any group or individual which is affected by the operations of the company.
Stakeholders include owners, stockholders, employees, customers, suppliers,
neighboring communities, individuals, governments, and others who may be
affected or influenced by its activities." Id.
129. Id.
130. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 1, 59 Stat.
1055, 1057, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, 994; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
131. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 130, art. 1.
132. See MALANCZUK, supra note 39, at 282.
133. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 130, art. 34.
134. See MALANCZUK, supra note 39, at 282.
135. See id. at 288.
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Organization (ILO).1 36 The ILO allows not only member nations
but also any "industrial association of employers or of workers" to
submit complaints concerning a member nation's non-compliance
with an ILO convention. 137 The committee is then authorized to
assess the complaints and address concerns to governments of
nations alleged to have breached treaty provisions. 138
Governments have an opportunity to respond,1 39 and then the ILO
makes a report and recommendations. 140
The ILO recently demonstrated a previously unseen capacity
to impose its "recommendations" on a delinquent member.' 4 ' In
response to recalcitrant behavior by the government of Myanmar
in violation of the Forced Labour Convention, the ILO Governing
Body utilized the never-before-invoked article 33 of the ILO
Convention. 142 Article 33 authorizes the ILO, when faced with a
member nation that flouts the Organization's recommendations, to
take "such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure
compliance therewith."'143 Pursuant to article 33, the ILO adopted
for Myanmar a resolution that calls upon "the Organization's
constituents as a whole - governments, employers and workers
[to] . . . take appropriate measures to ensure that [Myanmar] ...
cannot take advantage of... relations [with the constituents] to
perpetuate or extend the system of forced or compulsory labour;"' 44
calls upon international organizations to "cease as soon as possible
any activity that could have the effect of directly or indirectly
abetting the practice of forced or compulsory labour;"' 45 and calls
upon the U.N. Economic and Social Council "to place an item on
the agenda of its July 2000 session concerning the failure of
Myanmar to implement the recommendations."' 146  Thus, the
136. See generally ILO Constitution, supra note 61.
137. See id. art. 24.
138. See id.
139. See id. arts. 24, 26.
140. See id. art. 28.
141. See Int'l Labour Org., ILO Governing Body Opens the Way for
Unprecedented Action Against Forced Labour in Myanmar, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2000/44.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2001).
142. See id.
143. ILO Constitution, supra note 61, art. 33.
144. International Labour Conference Resolution Concerning the Measures
Recommended by the Governing Body Under Article 33 of the Constitution with
Respect to Myanmar, at http://www.lo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc88/pr-





Myanmar case may serve as a precedent for using the ILO's
mechanisms to secure compliance with labor treaties.
5. The Internet
There is a consensus among all parties concerned with labor
and other human rights abuses that communication, particularly
through the Internet, must be part of the solution. 47 According to
a U.S. State Department estimate, almost nine million people had
access to the Internet in China at the end of 1999.148 This was up
from an estimated 200,000 Chinese Internet users in 1997.149
Some experts estimate that by 2003, the number will be roughly
thirty-five million, and that China will be the second largest
Internet market in the world, behind only the United States. 150
The communicative power of the Internet has been widely
recognized. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has taken notice, in the
landmark First Amendment case of Reno v. ACLU:
The [World Wide] Web is . . . comparable, from the readers'
viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily
available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall
offering goods and services. From the publisher's point of
view, it constitutes a vast platform from which to address and
hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers,
viewers, researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization
with a computer connected to the Internet can "publish"
information. Publishers include government agencies,
educational institutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups,
and individuals ..... "No single organization controls any
membership in the Web, nor is there any centralized point
from which individual Web sites or services can be blocked
from the Web."' 5 1
Justice Stevens went on to explain that:
This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication
includes not only traditional print and news services, but also
audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time
dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a
phone line152 can become a town crier with a voice that
147. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 4444, supra note 95, at 38 (2000) (statement of
the Honorable Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative) (arguing that
China's accession to the WTO will "enable foreign businesses to participate
indirectly in information industries, such as telecom, including the Internet").
148. See STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1021.
149. See The Internet in China (National Public Radio, Nov. 24, 1999), available
at http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn/cmnpdOlfm.cfm?PrgDate=1 1/24/1999&PrgID=3.
150. See id.
151. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (quoting Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
152. Justice Stevens omitted here the fact that not only a phone line, but also a
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resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the
use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same
individual can become a pamphleteer. 153
The Chinese government has attempted to restrict Internet
use, but has been only partially successful. 5 4 One measure the
Chinese government has taken has been to enact strict licensing.
rules regulating news content.155 Only two online news
organizations, SINA.com and sohu.com, have been granted
licenses under these new rules.15 6 However, the Internet is by its
nature resistant to such attempts to crack down on it.157
II. Analysis
A. Limitations on the Effectiveness of Various Proposals
The best hope for reform in China is through a variety of
strategies working in concert. Most strategies that hold promise,
however, are similarly limited by a dependence upon the free flow
of information.
computer, are necessary to access most types of Internet communication.
153. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
154. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the technical
feasibility of Internet policing, but one of the most recent human rights reports
available details the Chinese government's attempts:
Chinese authorities struggled to gain control of the Internet, with its
estimated 16 million users. By the end of 1999, regulations had already
banned web operators from linking to foreign news sites, and companies
operating websites from hiring their own reporters. New regulations
issued in March 2000 forbade China-based websites from reporting news
from "independent news organizations," thus limiting them to state-
controlled sources .... Starting in March, some twenty provinces set up
special Internet police to expand the sao huang ("sweep away the pulp")
campaign, ostensibly aimed at removing pornography from the Internet. In
practice it was used to ban postings the government considered
objectionable .... [A] court sentenced Qi Yanchen, a founding member of
the quasi-independent China Development Union, to a four-year prison
term, in part for posting parts of his book, The Collapse of China, on the
Internet .... Stringent new regulations came into force on September 26,
2000 banning any materials judged subversive, supportive of so-called
cults, damaging to reunification efforts with Taiwan, or harmful to China's
reputation. Content and service providers were required to keep records of
all users and content for 60 days and to hand over the information to police
on demand.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2001: EVENTS OF
2000, at 183 (2001); see also STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1032-34 (detailing the
Chinese government's attempts to crack down on the Internet during 1999).
155. See Reuters, China Approves Two Portals for Online News (Dec. 29, 2000),
at http://search-engines-ranking.com/news/archiveOO/O01229.-sinasohu_ O.html.
156. See id.
157. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 889-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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1. China's Internal System
Inasmuch as China's internal system restricts the free flow of
information, it is the problem, and not a potential solution.
Systemic impediments to reform under the current Chinese form
of government make it unlikely that China's internal mechanisms,
without more, will ever achieve industry compliance with
international labor standards. The Western notion of the rule of
law has historically been slow to catch on in China, 158 and there is
no truly independent judiciary. 5 9 The U.S. State Department
explains:
[T]he judiciary is subject to policy guidance from both the
Government and the Communist Party, whose leaders use a
variety of means to direct courts on verdicts and sentences in
politically sensitive cases .... [O]ne expert estimated that
more than 70 percent of commercial cases in lower courts were
decided according to the wishes of local officials rather than
the law. 160
Furthermore, in an environment dominated by government-
run enterprises, prosecutorial power is entrusted to officials who
are "either intimately connected with or even the same as those
who are violating workers' rights." 161
Even to the extent that Chinese labor laws are fairly
enforced, they are facially inadequate to protect workers' rights. 162
Most significantly, the omission from Chinese law of any
protections for the right to strike163 drastically impairs workers'
ability to express their dissatisfaction. 164
Unequivocal recognition of the right to strike is not likely
forthcoming from the Chinese government. 165 China steadfastly
maintains that striking itself is not a right, but rather one means
to an end. 66 China further maintains that it has adequate
158. See Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Trade Policy and the Rule of Law, 9
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 361, 364 (2000) (remarking that under Chairman Mao,
China was in essence "an 'a-legal' society - a nation with neither lawyers, nor law
enforcement, nor laws").
159. See STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1028.
160. Id.
161. Mary Gallagher, An Unequal Battle: Why Labor Laws & Regulations Fail to
Protect Workers, CHINA RTS. F. (Summer 1997), at http://www.hrichina.org/
crf/english/97summer/e6.html.
162. See, e.g., ILO Report No. 316, supra note 89, § 365 (criticizing the Chinese
government's failure to recognize the right to strike).
163. See STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1060.
164. "Historically, workers have always had to win rights. These rights were
never granted or audited into existence." No Illusions, supra note 6.
165. See STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1060.
166. See, e.g., ILO Report No. 316, supra note 89, § 351 (summarizing the
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alternative means to accomplish those ends. 167 The crackdown on
labor rights activists is part of a broader policy of attempting to
silence dissent. 168 To the Chinese government, organizing a strike
in opposition to state-controlled employers is tantamount to
treason. 169 Because China is not likely to independently enforce
existing law or to sincerely embrace labor rights principles it has
not heretofore recognized, some form of external influence is
necessary.
2. U.S. Corporations Acting Alone
Any strategy that relies exclusively on TNCs to bring about
improvements in labor conditions cannot provide the sort of
external influence needed to overcome China's inertia. 70 By their
very nature, TNCs are motivated by the bottom line rather than a
sincere interest in improving labor conditions.17'
Thus, attempts at developing and implementing business
codes of conduct can be effective only to the extent that the very
corporations that are the subjects of the monitoring do not control
the process. 172  TNCs and autocratic governments embrace
corporate codes of conduct with weak enforcement mechanisms
Chinese government's position that the labor law provides adequate provisions for
settlement of collective bargaining disputes).
167. See id.
168. See AMNESTY INT'L, ANNUAL REPORT 2000 (2000), available at
http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2OOweb.nsf/ar2O00.
169. See Han Dongfang, A Long Hard Journey: The Rise of a Free Labor
Movenent, CHINA RTS. F. (Winter 1995) (explaining that there are no free labor
unions in China, and that the labor unions that do exist are simply arms of the
government, "serving to control workers by playing the part of hired thugs and
public security in workplaces"), at
http://www.hrichina.org/crf/english/95winter/e9.html; see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 154, at 180 (reporting Former Premier Li Peng's announcement
that China would not tolerate any political system that would "negate the
leadership of the Communist Party").
170. "American people no longer believe that companies can be trusted to police
themselves or to guarantee respect for fundamental human rights." KERNAGHAN,
supra note 28, at 63. See generally No Illusions, supra note 6.
171. See No Illusions, supra note 6 (explaining that TNCs operate to "meet
consumer demands of quality, price and timing"). See generally PNTR, Pub. L. No.
106-286, § 103, 110 Stat. 880, 882 (2000) (providing safeguards against market
disruption, and reflecting the assumption that consumers will want to buy
equivalent products at the cheapest price).
172. The Worker Rights Consortium is a practical improvement upon industry-
controlled monitoring organizations. United Students Against Sweatshops is
convinced that, no matter how well-intentioned these organizations may be, their
effect will be to relieve the pressure to clean up the industry, to cover up abuses,
and to lend the credibility of schools' names to the very companies that have




because such codes allow participating entities to look good
signing on without requiring them to actually change. 173 Any code
of business conduct that does not contain strong provisions
regarding monitoring of compliance, that is, safeguards for
communicating information about what really goes on in factories,
is thus subject to abuse. 174 Codes lacking such provisions should
be regarded with skepticism, and businesses' and governments'
motives should be scrutinized.
Corporations have a keen interest in restricting the
dissemination of information about the occurrence of labor rights
abuses.' 75 If they acknowledge claims of labor rights abuses at all,
corporations respond by insisting that their own codes of conduct
adequately protect workers' rights, and imply that horror stories of
labor rights abuses are unverifiable exaggerations. 176
Organizations tied to U.S. labor have an incentive to paint as
nasty a picture as possible of labor conditions in China. 177 If U.S.
labor leaders can scare consumers into believing that overseas
labor conditions are abominable, they protect American jobs.178
Whom, then, to believe? Without independent reporting of the
type that freely speaking press, NGOs, or labor unions might
provide, without freedom of association acting to protect workers'
ability to air their grievances, and without neutral investigative
fact-finding by an independent judiciary, outsiders cannot say with
certainty whether or not labor abuses are happening. 179
In any question of credibility, the benefit of the doubt is with
the side arguing for increased emphasis on human rights,
particularly rights of open communication such as a free press and
the freedom for workers to air their grievances. Those who would
"delink" human rights considerations from trade policy
considerations arouse suspicion that they have something to fear
from a more open flow of information. 8 0 Corporations appear to
want to maintain the status quo when they refuse to support
measures that would pressure the Chinese government to adopt
173. See No Illusions, supra note 6.
174. See Worker Rights Consortium, supra note 103.
175. See KERNAGHAN, supra note 28, at 67.
176. See id. at 15.
177. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
179. See KERNAGHAN, supra note 28, at 7.
180. 'What companies fear most is the light of day. Public exposure is to them
what a cross means to Dracula. They do not want a widespread public debate
focused on conditions and wages in their offshore factories ...." Id. at 67.
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more open policies, and when they are resistant to stern provisions
in business codes of conduct for monitoring compliance.' 8 1
Business codes of conduct emphasizing truly independent
monitoring provisions, such as that promulgated by the Worker
Rights Consortium (WRC), are thus superior to more modest codes
such as the Fair Labor Association's (FLA). With respect to
substantive standards for factory conditions, none of these codes
requires substantially more than Chinese laws and treaties that
on their face already recognize international labor standards. 8 2
Therefore, the value of a code is primarily in its ability to monitor
and promote compliance with such existing standards. 183
There are several similarities between the WRC and FLA
procedures for monitors, as outlined in the respective charter
documents of each organization. 184 Both frameworks call for
internal and "independent" monitoring, 8 5 and both organizations
call for the involvement of local NGOs.186
What distinguishes the WRC plan is its theme throughout
the monitoring system of complete independence from the
influence of the corporations being monitored. 187 The WRC plan
calls for TNCs to publish the locations of all of their factories, as
well as factories with whom they subcontract. 8 8 The WRC puts a
greater emphasis on unannounced inspections and on soliciting
candid information from workers themselves. 189 The WRC plan
has the benefit of not having to rely on voluntary cooperation from
the companies that are the subjects of the monitoring. 190 Instead,
181. See id.
182. See Fair Labor Ass'n, Charter Document, available at
www.fairlabor.orgthtmllamendctr.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2001); Draft Principles,
supra note 27, 17-24. See generally China Labor Act, at
http:natlex.ilo.org/txt/E9YCHNO1.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2001).
183. See Sweatshop Watch, supra note 105.
184. See id.
185. See Fair Labor Ass'n, supra note 182; see also Fair Labor Ass'n, supra note
104; Fair Labor Ass'n, Comparison of the FLA and the WRC, at
http://www.fairlabor.orgthtml/affiliates/university.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2001);
Worker Rights Consortium, Worker Rights Consortium for the Enforcement of
University Licensing Codes of Conduct, at http://www.workersrights.org/
detailedoutline.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2001).
186. However, the State Department notes that "[tihere are no independent
domestic NGO's that publicly monitor or comment on human rights conditions" in
China. STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1053.
187. See Worker Rights Consortium, supra note 185 (explaining that industry
representatives will have "no influence" over the inspection process); see also supra
note 172 (comparing the WRC and United Students Against Sweatshops).





the WRC proposes to force the industry into compliance by
denying lucrative college and university licensing contracts to
TNCs that do not comply.191 Included in the conditions is
acceptance of factory inspections on the WRC's terms.192
The FLA responds that its framework will have broader
applicability, not only to other garment manufacturers, but also to
other industries. 193  The WRC strategy is limited in its
applicability to those apparel manufacturers seeking university
licenses.1 94  The trade-off is that the FLA must enlist the
cooperation of industry in order to achieve broader applicability.
Thus, each code has severe limitations.
While the WRC plan is generally preferable, the FLA also
plays a constructive role. Labor rights activists need all the
leverage they can find, particularly in light of the passage of
PNTR. Although both the FLA and the WRC are non-profit
organizations, they nevertheless compete in that each strives to
get as many schools as possible to participate in its plan. 195
Despite some bad blood between the two organizations,1 96 the
competition between them seems to be turning into a healthy one.
Each organization has made changes in response to the other's
criticism. 9 7  Moreover, schools are provided a choice, when
awarding licensing contracts, between supporting the FLA, with
its broad scope, and the WRC, with its greater assurances of truly
independent monitoring.
Schools should be wary, however, of embracing a plan that
claims broad applicability, but in fact has little or no practical
effect.198 In selling human rights plans to businesses, labor rights
activists must be careful not to sell out the principles that justify
scrutiny of activities in China. 199 U.S. citizens are justified in
promoting human rights in China because U.S. consumers are
entitled to information about what really happens in
sweatshops, 200 not because U.S. businesses are entitled to attract
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See Fair Labor Ass'n, supra note 185.
194. See id.
195. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 101-113 and accompanying text.
197. In response to criticism, the Worker Rights Consortium has now published
a code with specific provisions. See Worker Rights Consortium, supra note 185.
The FLA likewise recognizes that it is a work in progress, and has identified areas
for improvement. See Fair Labor Ass'n, supra note 104.
198. See Worker Rights Consortium, supra note 185.
199. See KERNEGHAN, supra note 28, at 10.
200. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
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consumers with warm-fuzzy feelings about the production of their
sweatshirts. 201
Just as American TNCs using Chinese factories have an
interest in preventing Americans from finding out about abuses in
those factories, they also have an interest in preventing abused
factory workers from finding out about the rights that Americans
enjoy. If PNTR is to have the beneficial effect of bringing Western
ideas to China, activists must make sure that supremacy of
corporate profit is not the only Western idea that finds its way to
Chinese laborers. 20 2
Unfortunately, it appears that "Just do it" is the only
American slogan that workers in slave-like conditions in Nike's
Sewon Factory in Jiaozhou City, China learn.20 3 This ubiquitous
catch-phrase, after all, is the message that ironically hangs on
their factory wall, 204 not anything remotely like "all men are
created equal.... they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights... among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness." 20 5  It is naive at best to suggest, as
proponents of PNTR have, that "[t]he very presence of American
business has exposed the Chinese to a culture where individual
rights are respected and human dignity valued." 206
Those who are sincerely concerned about labor rights in
China cannot rest on the hope that Chinese workers will discover
the principles of open communication and free association through
the fumes of glue and shoe leather.207 If increased openness has
been achieved in China in recent years, the credit does not belong
201. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
202. See KERNAGHAN, supra note 28, .at 10. The author quotes Chinese labor
activist Han Dongfang:
People have always said foreign investment is the hope of China. This is
our bridge to the world. But what comes across the bridge are 12-hour
shifts, seven-day work weeks and only two trips to the bathroom a day.
What comes across are factory fires that kill hundreds of workers who are
locked in because their bosses are afraid they will steal the products. The
Chinese government has put an invisible net across the bridge that allows
money to come in but not the freedoms of a civil society, not the rule of law
and not free trade unions.
Id.
203. See KERNAGHAN, supra note 5, at 69.
204. See id.
205. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
206. Hearing on H.R. 4444, supra note 95, at 179 (statement of Frederick W.
Smith, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, FedEx Corporation).
207. See KERNAGHAN, supra note 28, Preface (recounting the story of a Chinese
college graduate's "dreams of democracy, freedom and human rights" having been
shattered by his experience at a foreign-managed factory).
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to the increased presence of American TNCs. 208 U.S. labor and
human rights activists must continue to use the opening of China
to make further contacts with their Chinese counterparts, and
thus increase Chinese workers' awareness of their rights.
3. The ICJ and the ILO
The ICJ suffers from several impediments. At the outset, the
Court's scope is limited to disputes between nations that have
voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction. Malanczuk explains that
"where states see their vital interests involved, they will not
submit easily to adjudication." 20 9 In addition, only nations may be
parties, 210 and the government of one nation may have no
incentive to bring a claim against another. As Congress'
overwhelming vote in passing PNTR demonstrates, the U.S.
government is politically reluctant to pressure China on labor
rights. 21'
Furthermore, the U.N. has not settled upon an effective
means of enforcing ICJ judgments. 212 The U.N. Security Council
has authority to "make recommendations or decide upon measures
to be taken to give effect to" an ICJ decision, 213 but it has never
used that authority. 214 ICJ decisions "are often simply ignored."
215
The enforcement problem would be especially acute in any
ICJ case between the United States and China, for the United
States used its veto power to block enforcement of an ICJ decision
in a dispute with Nicaragua. 216 China, one of the other permanent
members of the Security Council, could do the same.
217
The ILO's recent actions against Myanmar show that the ILO
scheme is not hampered in the same way as the ICJ.218 The ILO
could theoretically take action against China to ensure treaty
compliance, regardless of whether China agrees to the
proceedings.2 19 Unions do not have to wait for their governments
208. See id.
209. MALANCZUK, supra note 39, at 292.
210. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 98 (showing that H.R. 4444, PNTR, passed eighty-three to
fifteen).
212. See MALANCZUK, supra note 39, at 288-89.
213. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
214. See MALANCZUK, supra note 39, at 288.
215. Id. at 291.
216. See id. at 289.
217. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 23, 27.
218. See supra notes 136-146 and accompanying text.
219. As is the case with the U.N. Security Council, China holds a permanent
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to take action but may submit complaints directly to the ILO
themselves. 220 The ILO has shown itself capable of invoking
article 33 of its constitution to take measures putting real pressure
on offending nations. 221
Hence, the primary limitation on the ILO as an avenue for
promoting reform in China may be its dependency on access to
reliable information on factory conditions. It has been a
tremendous challenge to get necessary information on conditions
in Myanmar. 222 Similar hurdles exist in China. 223 When foreign
governments or outside individuals do not know about specific
instances of labor rights violations, they cannot bring them to the
attention of the ILO. 224
B. Overcoming the Limitations
The exchange of information is the key to pushing reform.
The Internet may be the best hope for freeing Chinese workers
from the shackles of a system that attempts to silence dissent.225
Whether in the hands of international labor unions, sympathetic
NGOs, or Chinese laborers themselves, the Internet can be a
powerful tool for effectuating the necessary flow of information.
More than any other medium, the Internet has the potential to
enable Chinese workers to disseminate accounts of factory
conditions, access information about their rights, and
seat on the ILO Governing Body. While there is no veto power, it may be
substantially more difficult to bring sanctions against a powerful nation such as
China than against a small pariah like Myanmar. See Int'l Labour Org., Governing
Body of International Labour Office, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/relm/gb/index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2001).
220. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
222. See Blaine Harden, How to Commit the Perfect Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2000, at AS.
223. See KERNAGHAN, supra note 5, at 5.
224. Commentators have suggested that labor rights issues in China could be
advanced under the Alien Tort Claims Act. See Douglas S. Morrin, People Before
Profits: Pursuing Corporate Accountability for Labor Rights Violations Abroad
Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 427 (2000)
(reviewing RUSSEL MOKHIBER & ROBERT WEISSMAN, CORPORATE PREDATORS: THE
HUNT FOR MEGA-PROFITS AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY (1999)). Others have
suggested using the fairness in advertising provisions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. See Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC:
Advancing Human Rights Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 603 (2000). Like most strategies with any chance of effectively
advancing Chinese labor rights, litigation in U.S. courts is heavily dependent upon
access to reliable information concerning what really happens in Chinese factories.
225. See The Internet in China, supra note 149.
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communicate with one another for the purpose of organizing to
collectively air their grievances. 226
Certain properties of the Internet give it unique potential to
overcome the Chinese government's penchant for restricting all
forms of communication. It can reach a wide audience almost
instantaneously, before censors have time to act.227  It also
protects anonymity.228
Justice O'Connor, dissenting in part in Reno v. ACLU,229
recognized that "[b]ecause it is no more than the interconnection of
electronic pathways, cyberspace allows speakers and listeners to
mask their identities." 230 She further explained that "[s]ince users
can transmit and receive messages on the Internet without
revealing anything about their identities... it is not currently
possible to exclude persons from accessing certain messages on the
basis of their identity."231  Justice O'Connor unfortunately
mischaracterized this property of the Internet as an unmitigated
shortcoming,232 when in fact it is also one of the Internet's unique
virtues. As the Supreme Court acknowledged almost forty years
earlier, "[plersecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices
and laws either anonymously or not at all."233  Because the
Internet conceals not only of the identity and geographical location
of the speaker, but also the identity and geographical location of
all receivers of the information, it provides an even greater
safeguard of anonymity than a conventional publication that
merely omits the author's name. 234
However, Chinese authorities have demonstrated that state-
of-the-art technology has some ability to peer through the
Internet's veil of anonymity. 235 A recent online article, Police
226. See id.; see also Hearing on H.R. 4444, supra note 95, at 38 (statement of
Hon. Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative) (arguing that China's
accession to the WTO will "enable foreign businesses to participate in information
industries, such as telecom, including the Internet").
227. See The Internet in China, supra note 149.
228. See id.
229. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
230. Id. at 889 (opinion of O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
231. Id. at 890 (internal citation omitted).
232. See id. at 891.
233. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1959) (upholding the right of a
pamphleteer to distribute anonymous pamphlets).
234. Compare the leafleteer in Talley, id., with the anonymous sources for the
National Labor Committee reports, the latter being unseen and the whereabouts of
whom are never known. See KERNAGHAN, supra note 5, at 5.
235. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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Brutality in Cyberspace, warns that governments can and do track
down persons who use the Internet in ways deemed unlawful.
236
But the article is primarily revealing in light of its source. The
article comes from SINA.com, one of only two Internet news
services licensed by the Chinese government. 237 The frightful title
typifies an overall tone that carefully postures to appear critical of
government crackdowns. 238
When one understands, however, that the content has likely
been reviewed and approved by Chinese government censors,
239
one recognizes the article as a series of government threats craftily
masquerading as an independent editorial. The authors
admonish, "[N]ever underestimate the power of governments ....
[G]overnments, courts and regulatory bodies are proving
unusually creative in finding that physical Achilles heel, whether
it is targeting the company itself or its customers, suppliers,
advertisers, investors and transaction facilitators." 240 The article
continues, "[tlhere is truly nowhere to hide from the long arm of
commercial law."24 1 While the article is ostensibly about business
technology and not politics, 242 the reader is clearly to infer that
unacceptable political speech will be likewise punished. The
English version of the article then lapses into the second person:
"[y]ou aren't even safe sitting at home downloading a couple of
MP3s from an acquaintance overseas. Unless you are surfing from
a virtual computer, your equipment itself can also be targeted to
help enforce laws."243  The most prominent feature of the
SINA.com logo, a large, watchful eye, 244 is thus not the keen eye of
236. See SINA.com, Police Brutality in Cyberspace, at http:/lenglish.sina.com/
news/TechBuddha/2000/1130/TechBuddha.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2001).
237. See id.; see also Reuters, supra note 155 ("Chinese Internet portals sina.com
and sohu.com said on Friday they had been granted news-publishing licenses under
restrictive new rules due to take effect next week.").
238. See SINA.com, supra note 236.
239. See Reuters, supra note 155.
The rules, which will force all Web sites to use politically vetted content
from existing state media, are part of an effort by Communist authorities
to block potentially subversive content spreading online. SINA and Sohu
already comply with the rules, so the award of the licenses will have little
effect on their sites.
Id.
240. SINA.com, supra note 236.
241. Id.
242. See id. The article superficially comports with the requirement that online
news reports be devoid of political content, but the politically loaded message
between the lines is thinly disguised. See id. When the government approves of
the message, such a thin veil is apparently acceptable to the censors.
243. Id.
244. See http://sina.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2001).
20011
Law and Inequality
an independent news source, but the eye of Big Brother gazing
straight at the reader. The designers of this symbol surely
calculated its psychological impact.
Despite such control tactics, the consensus among advocates
for reform in China is consistent with Justice Stevens' and Justice
O'Connor's opinions in Reno that the Internet is virtually
impossible to police effectively. 245  The Chinese government's
efforts to restrict the Internet suggest that the authorities are
extremely nervous about the power of the Internet to disrupt their
control over the exchange of information.246 While the availability
of limited technology to track sources of individual Internet
transmissions exists, 247 it will only become more difficult for such
tracking technology to keep pace with the sheer volume of Internet
transmissions as use of the Internet continues to grow
exponentially. 248 One expert on Asian technology trends has noted
that:
In Asia, the Internet is stirring a social revolution .... In the
past, many Asians have felt repressed; they have felt unable to
talk about so many things. On the Internet, they can be
anonymous. They can say they hate their boss and talk freely
about sex. And talk politics .... The reach of the Net has
already had a fundamental impact on Asian politics .... As
the Internet provides access to ideas and information, people
develop more diverse points of view. The Net and related
technologies are encouraging individuals to express their
opinions more frequently, efficiently and vociferously. Asian
governments that previously relied on control will be forced to
concede a higher degree of freedom to their people. The
Internet, inadvertently and indirectly, will soon be the
foremost exponent of democracy. The power of millions of
people connected by the Net will change the world, and
governments will have no choice but to change too. 2 4 9
245. See, e.g., Yu Jie, Fight for China: The People Have New Weapons: The
Internet and the Law, Says Yu Jie, ASIAWEEK (Nov. 24, 2000) (providing as an
example that "[n]arrow-minded Chinese officials blacked out the news that Paris-
based Gao Xingjian had won the Nobel Prize for Literature. But discussions on
Gao and his works are everywhere on the Internet. The Internet police just can't
do anything about it!"), at
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/1124/ann.voices-china.html; see
also The Internet in China, supra note 149.
246. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
248. See STATE DEP'T, supra note 1, at 1032-34.
249. Yat Siu, Swift and Total: That's What the Internet's Impact on Asia Will Be,
Says Techno Whiz Yat Siu, ASIAWEEK (Nov. 24, 2000), at
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/l 124/ann.voices-net.html.
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The Internet has apparently become the medium of choice by
which global human rights activists publish material on China.
250
IV. Conclusion
It is ironic that the government of a nation that defiantly
claims a Marxist/Maoist heritage embracing the slogan "workers of
the world, unite!" is, by virtue of its own paranoid grip on power,
enabling U.S. corporations to subjugate the workers among its
own citizens. The Chinese government is not likely to reform on
its own, and the passage of PNTR leaves precious few levers for
advancing human rights. The best and most realistic strategy is
to attack the problem on as many fronts as possible, while being
wary of disingenuous proposals that could be counterproductive.
Because most of the labor problems are closely related to
restrictions on the flow of information, the overarching theme in
advancing labor rights must be the promotion of freer speech and
communication. Thus, business codes of conduct that bring abuses
to light by explicitly requiring disclosure of factory locations,
unannounced inspections, confidentiality safeguards, and
unsupervised interviews of workers should be preferred over codes
that merely prescribe business conduct without adequately
providing for monitoring; and, in working with China under the
new Memorandum of Understanding on Human Rights, the U.N.
should emphasize associational rights such as the right to form
truly free unions and the right to strike. These rights will enable
workers to voice their grievances more effectively. Above all, the
growth of the Internet should be encouraged because it can help
wherever open communication is required. The struggle for labor
rights is thus inseparable from the broader struggle for the human
right of free expression.
250. See, e.g., http://www.hrichina.org (providing daily updates, links and
alternative English or Chinese versions of the website at the click of a mouse). This
Article has given parallel Internet citations for sources when possible, and,
significantly, it was possible for most sources. See, e.g., STATE DEP'T, supra note 1,
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1999-hrpreport/
china.html (2000). That several of the sources on which this Article relies are
available exclusively through the Internet, see, e.g., Fair Labor Ass'n, supra note
185, is testament to the unique power of the Internet to facilitate the free exchange
of ideas and information.
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